



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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


# National Intelligence Daily

*Friday*  
*2 February 1979*

State Dept. review completed

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
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
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


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## SITUATION REPORTS

## IRAN


*Ayatollah Khomeini has not named the members of his Islamic Revolutionary Council, apparently as a concession to moderate opposition members who have urged him to proceed cautiously in his relationship with the government. One of Khomeini's aides, however, said that the Council would be announced within two or three days. The aide also said that strikes would continue until the establishment of an Islamic republic.*

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Khomeini's remarks indicate he still fears that the Shah may yet be able to use the military, with help from abroad, to stage a return, or that divisions within the opposition might lead to reestablishment of the monarchy. He advised all foreign advisers to the Iranian Army to leave, denounced "foreign agents who are trying to bring the Shah back and save the regime," and urged intellectuals, members of the opposition, and minority groups to remain united with the Islamic movement.

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
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Khomeini and the opposition have not yet decided how they will take power from Prime Minister Bakhtiar and the military. They will probably try to keep pressure on the government through strikes and demonstrations while continuing negotiations to arrange a transition to an Islamic republic.

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

The Liberation Movement of Iran was central to the negotiations between Khomeini and the military in the last few weeks and will probably continue in that role. Loosely associated with the National Front, the Liberation Movement and the 74-year-old Bazargan have emerged as the most dynamic members of the secular opposition. Unlike most other secular politicians in Iran, Bazargan has well-established ties with the Islamic clerical figures. 

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The Liberation Movement of Iran does not appear to have its own broad popular base but rather has tied itself to Khomeini's mass following. Bazargan is trusted by Khomeini but is more moderate in his views than the Ayatollah. The Movement's leadership may well play a key role in any government Khomeini establishes. 

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ANGOLA: Possible Reduction of Cuban Troops

*The Angolan charge d'affaires in Havana has told the US Interests Section that a reduction of Cuban troop strength in Angola was a major topic of discussion during President Neto's visit to Cuba that ended Monday. Although the Angolan Government apparently is not opposed to the reduction of Cuban forces, neither Luanda nor Havana wants a substantial withdrawal that would jeopardize Angola's ability to deal with perceived threats from South African incursions or from Angolan insurgents.*

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The charge said Neto and some members of the ruling political party--with an eye toward the nonaligned summit scheduled for September in Havana--believe a Cuban drawdown will lessen criticism of Angola by Nigeria and other African moderates. Other Angolan Government officials fear, however, that the US may interpret the troop reductions as knuckling under to US pressure.

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The charge also asserted that Luanda is disillusioned because there has been no positive US gesture toward Angola following visits by Assistant Secretary of State Moose and Senator McGovern. He added that until diplomatic relations are established, Angola probably will not accept any more visits by US officials to discuss bilateral affairs, although Angola would still be willing to discuss southern African problems.

We believe Cuba would limit any withdrawal to a few thousand of its estimated 19,000 to 20,000 military personnel in Angola. Notwithstanding Neto's decision to establish relations with China, Cuba has a heavy stake in the Neto government. Moreover, with the breakdown of efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rhodesia, Cuba anticipates mounting pressure from Mozambican President Machel for protection against Rhodesian strikes and would probably want to maintain a large presence in Angola to meet this contingency.

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
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
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SAUDI ARABIA - SOUTH YEMEN: Ismail Visit

Saudi Arabia has agreed to receive South Yemeni President Ismail at the end of his current trip to other countries in the region. The Saudis reportedly hope to calm tensions along the border between North and South Yemen--the scene of recent armed clashes. The visit may indicate an interest by both sides in easing differences, but we doubt that the Saudis will persuade Ismail to relax his efforts to subvert North Yemen's government. The Saudis have reassured North Yemeni President Salih that they do not intend to sacrifice their good relations with his country, whose leaders are nonetheless apprehensive about Ismail's proposed visit.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

THAILAND: Foreign Policy Following Vietnamese Invasion of Kampuchea

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[REDACTED]

*Since the end of the Vietnam war in 1975, Thailand has sought detente with its Communist neighbors and a closer relationship with its partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--while at the same time maintaining a security lifeline to the US. So far this approach has been successful, thanks to the skill and flexibility of Prime Minister Kriangsak--the architect of Thai policy since the military resumed control of the Thai Government in October 1976.*

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[REDACTED]

*Kriangsak will be in Washington next week*

[REDACTED]

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The Thai have reacted with characteristic caution to the invasion of Kampuchea, trying to keep their options open until the situation there is clarified. Vietnam is doing what it can to reinforce that caution, blending reassurance that Thailand's security is not threatened with warnings not to interfere. The Thai are fairly confident that the task of gaining full control of Kampuchea will preoccupy Vietnam for some time. They are, however, deeply concerned about Vietnam's long-term intentions, fearing that Vietnam will expand its support to Thai Communist insurgents and might ultimately try to seize northeast Thailand, a region with close ethnic ties to Laos.

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[REDACTED] Thai leaders are worrying about China's value as an effective counterweight to Vietnam's growing power in the region,

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
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
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
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particularly now that Vietnam has the increased backing of the USSR. The Thai nonetheless still believe that China can play a useful role in blunting Vietnamese ambitions.

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


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
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Thai expectations for increased US support are modest. The Thai are aware that a high US military profile in Thailand could, in fact, provoke the Vietnamese hostility they hope to avoid. Committed to a policy

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[REDACTED]

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of detente, Bangkok basically seeks reassurance that the US backstop is still there. Reiteration of Washington's commitment to the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat Communiqué--which provides for US intervention if Thai security is seriously threatened by an outside power--is a perennial request by Thai governments and one Kriangsak is certain to renew. [REDACTED]

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The Thai further realize that growth of the insurgency in their country--which remains at modest levels--is more likely than a Vietnamese invasion. Thailand has the military resources to handle the insurgents. Bangkok, however, does look for foreign aid in helping to address some of the insurgency's underlying causes--rural poverty and an inadequate infrastructure--and may seek an increased US commitment to aid rural development projects.

[REDACTED]

#### Balancing Act

Prime Minister Kriangsak's announcement this week that he will visit Moscow in March--a visit the Soviets have pressed for since last summer--is no doubt part of his attempt to maintain a cosmetic balance in Thailand's foreign policy as well as a reflection of Bangkok's assessment of growing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Bangkok may hope that more cordial relations with the USSR will pay off in fewer problems for Thailand with the USSR's Vietnamese clients. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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
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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)



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